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Abstract: The popularity of social networks is mainly conditioned by the integrity and the quality of contents generated
by users as well as the maintenance of users’ privacy. More precisely, Twitter data (e.g. tweets) are valuable
for a tremendous range of applications such as search engines and recommendation systems in which working
on a high quality information is a compulsory step. However, the existence of ill-intentioned users in Twitter
imposes challenges to maintain an acceptable level of data quality. Spammers are a concrete example of
ill-intentioned users. Indeed, they have misused all services provided by Twitter to post spam content which
consequently leads to serious problems such as polluting search results. As a natural reaction, various detection
methods have been designed which inspect individual tweets or accounts for the existence of spam. In the
context of large collections of Twitter users, applying these conventional methods is time consuming requiring
months to filter out spam accounts in such collections. Moreover, Twitter community cannot apply them either
randomly or sequentially on each user registered because of the dynamicity of Twitter network. Consequently,
these limitations raise the need to make the detection process more systematic and faster. Complementary
to the conventional detection methods, our proposal takes the collective perspective of users (or accounts) to
provide a searchable information to retrieve accounts having high potential for being spam ones. We provide
a design of an unsupervised automatic method to predict spammy naming patterns, as searchable information,
used in naming spam accounts. Our experimental evaluation demonstrates the efficiency of predicting spammy
naming patterns to retrieve spam accounts in terms of precision, recall, and normalized discounted cumulative
gain at different ranks.
service to retrieve tweets; (v) opening new Twitter ac-
counts without imposing restrictions from verification
point of view (Benevenuto et al., 2010).
The openness of OSNs and the lack of effective
restrictions have attracted a special kind of unethical
and ill-intentioned individuals well known as ”spam-
mers”. They misuse OSNs’ services to publish and
spread misleading, fake, and out of context informa-
tion. A wide range of goals drives spammers to pub-
lish spam content, summarized in (Benevenuto et al.,
2010): (i) spreading advertisements to generate sales
and gain illegal profits; (ii) disseminating porn mate-
rials; (iii) publishing viruses and malwares; (iv) creat-
ing phishing websites to reveal sensitive information.
Performing spamming tasks can constitute major
problems in different areas, not limited to: (i) pollut-
ing search results by spam posts or tweets; (ii) de-
grading the accuracy of statistics obtained by mining
tools; (iii) consuming storage resources; (iv) and vi-
1 INTRODUCTION
Onlinesocialnetworks(OSNs)havebecomethetop
communicationmediaandalmostthefirstoptionfor
users to share links, discuss, and connect with oth-
ers. However, the existence of easy interactive in-
terfacesand lowbarriers topublicationhavecaused
various informationquality (IQ)problems (e.g. So-
cial spam, Rumor) in OSNs, making the obtaining
ofaccurateandrelevantinformationachallenge. As
an example, Twitter platform is one of many pop-
ular social networks, which has distinctive services
not available in the same power in other social net-
works. Indeed,theseserviceshavepropertiesrevolv-
ing around: (i) delivering posts (tweets) in a real-
time manner; (ii) inserting URL(s) pointing out to
external source(s) of information; (iii) adding hash-
tagsintweetstogroupthesimilartweetstofacilitate
thesearchprocess; (iv)providinga real-timesearch
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olating user’s privacy. Hence, because of the impor-
tance of OSNs data in various areas such as search
engines and research fields, the optimal solution is fil-
tering out the noisy data to have high quality informa-
tion. Information quality process in social networks
can be summarized in three main steps: (i) selecting
the data collection (e.g. Facebook accounts, Tweets,
Facebook posts) that needs improvement; (ii) deter-
mining the noise type (e.g. spam, rumor) to be filtered
out; (iii) at last, applying pre-designed algorithms de-
pending on the chosen noise type to produce a new
noise free data collection.
Motivation and Problem. We focus on treating a
special issue related to social spam problem to be a
complementary solution with our team researches on
social networks. Our team has researches(Abascal-
Mena et al., 2015; Mezghani et al., 2014; Abascal-
Mena et al., 2014; Mezghani et al., 2015; Abascal-
Mena et al., 2015; On-at et al., 2016) addressing
a wide range of social networks problems like so-
cial profiling, profile enrichment, social interests de-
tection, and sociosemantic communities detection, in
which Twitter platform has been adopted in perform-
ing experiments and validations. Subsequently, ex-
perimenting on an acceptable quality of data collec-
tions is highly required to have high accurate and pre-
cise results.
In the battle of fighting spam, a considerable set of
methods (Wang, 2010; Benevenuto et al., 2010; Lee
et al., 2010; McCord and Chuah, 2011; Stringhini
et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2011; Amleshwaram et al.,
2013; Cao and Caverlee, 2015; Chu et al., 2012b;
Meda et al., 2014; Santos et al., 2014; Martinez-
Romo and Araujo, 2013) has been designed for de-
tecting either spam accounts or spam campaigns,
with little attention dedicated toward spam tweets
detection. These conventional methods are mainly
grounded on exploiting the features extraction con-
cept combined with supervised machine learning al-
gorithms to build a predictive model using an anno-
tated data-set. However, performing these methods
on large collections consisting of millions of Twit-
ter users (or accounts) is time consuming, requiring
months to process ”crawled” large collections. In-
deed, the use of Twitter REST APIs1 causes this bot-
tleneck problem, where no alternative way exists to
collect (or retrieve) complete information about users.
More precisely, Twitter imposes unavoidable restric-
tions and limitations on the number of calls deter-
mined according to the functionally of the used REST
API. For instance, retrieving information for half mil-
lion of users, including the meta-data of users’ fol-
lowers and followees, may take approximately three
1https://dev.twitter.com/rest/public
Figure 1: Illustrative example of spam tweets posted by dif-
ferent users having common screen name pattern ”voted-
dlovatu”.
months. Also, Twitter itself may avoid performing
the conventional detection methods on each registered
user (or account) either in a sequential or a random
manner. We justify this avoidance because of the dy-
namicity of network in tracking daily updates (e.g.
new accounts) on it.
Searchable Information. The conventional detec-
tion methods don’t provide information more than the
class label of the considered user (spammer or le-
gitimate user) or tweet (spam or non-spam). Thus,
to make the detection process more systematic and
faster, having searchable information (i.e. string pat-
terns used in naming accounts) can contribute in re-
trieving the accounts that have high probability for
being spam. For instance, the spam tweets illustrated
in figure 1 show a particular pattern ”voteddlovatu”
exploited in creating and launching a spam bot. In-
deed, such a string pattern can be used as a query to
retrieve all accounts that contain this string pattern to
apply then the conventional detection methods. It is
important to note that spammers avoid using random
or rubbish names since they automate the creation of
Twitter accounts where the IDs must be unique. Thus,
to ensure the uniqueness, spammers define the IDs
through using an unique pattern combined with a sys-
tematic simple counting (e.g. ”15”, ”1”, and ”5”) as
illustrated in the given example. Also, as one of spam-
mers’ principles, the name of accounts must be attrac-
tive for normal users (legitimate users) and therefore
using random or rubbish names is not the solution at
all.
Contributions. In this paper, we aim at predict-
ing spammy naming patterns exploited in establish-
ing accounts, where those patterns are used as search-
able information query for retrieving spam accounts.
More precisely, we leverage the meta-data of users
(or accounts) posted tweets associated with topics
(e.g. hashtags). Then, we predict the spammy nam-
ing patterns through passing the considered set of
users into three consecutive stages. The first stage
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detects the communities that the users are belong-
ing to using heuristic information extracted from the
users’ meta-data as an estimation for the social con-
nections among users. In the second stage, each
community is represented by two sets of string pat-
terns elicited from the screen name and user name at-
tributes. At last, each community is labeled as a spam
bot through measuring the degree of similarity be-
tween the distribution of corresponding string patterns
and the uniform distribution of patterns with classify-
ing the string patterns as spam in case of high dis-
similarity among distributions. We demonstrate the
effectiveness of spammy string patterns through a se-
ries of experiments conducted on a crawled and an
annotated data-set containing more than half million
tweets collected from 50 trending hashtags. The ex-
perimental results show that the spammy patterns of
the screen name and user name attributes have supe-
rior performance in terms of three different informa-
tion retrieval metrics (Precision@L, Recall@L, Nor-
malized Discounted Cumulative Gain@L ), compared
to five proposed baselines. With the results obtained,
our method can be leveraged in different ways:
• For a crawled data collection, our method can
be applied to retrieve the accounts that have high
probability for being spam in the target collection.
Then, the conventional detection methods can be
performed to process the top accounts (e.g. top
1,000), speeding-up the filtration process without
needing to examine each account in the collection.
• Twitter can integrate our spam retrieval method
with its anti-spam mechanism to search for spam
accounts in a systematic and fast way.
The remainder of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 presents the Twitter’s anti-spam
mechanism as well as the spammer detection methods
proposed in the literature. Section 3 presents the no-
tations, problem formalization, and the design of the
three stages to predict the spammy naming patterns.
Section 4 details the data-set used in experimenting
and validating our approach. The experimental setup
and a series of experiments evaluating the proposed
approach are described in section 5. At last, section 6
concludes the work with offering directions for future
work.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED
WORK
• Spammers are goal-oriented persons targeting to
achieve unethical goals (e.g. promote products),
and thus they use their smartness to accomplish
their spamming tasks in an effective and a quick
way.
• Spammers often create and launch a bot (group)
of spam accounts in a short period (e.g. in
one day), to maximize their monetary profit and
speedup their spamming behavior.
• As a set of REST APIs is provided by social net-
works, spammers leverage them to automate their
spamming tasks in a systematic way (e.g. tweet
every 10 minutes). Indeed, they avoid the random
posting behavior because it may decrease the tar-
get profit and decelerate their spamming behavior.
Twitter’s Anti-Spam Mechanism. Twitter fights
spammers through allowing users to report spam ac-
counts simply by clicking on ”Report: they are post-
ing spam” option available on the account page.
When an user reports a particular account, Twitter’s
administrators review manually the reported account
to make the suspension decision. However, adopt-
ing such a method for combating spammers needs a
great effort from both users and administrators. More-
over, not all reports are trustworthy, meaning that
some reported accounts are for legitimate users, not
spammers. Besides the manual reporting mechanism,
Twitter has defined some general rules (e.g. not al-
lowed to post porn materials) for public to reduce the
spam problem as possible with suspending perma-
nently the accounts that violate those rules (Twitter,
2016). However, Twitter’s rules are easy to bypass
by spammers. For instance, spammers may coordi-
nate multiple accounts with distributing the desired
workload among them to mislead the detection pro-
cess. Doing so, the separated accounts tend to exhibit
invisible spam behavior. Thus, these shortcomings
have motivated researchers to propose more power-
ful methods for the applications that use Twitter as
a source of information. Hence, we categorize the
spam detection approaches dedicated for Twitter into
two different types based on the automation detection
level: (i) machine learning level as a fully automated
approach; (ii) and social honeypot as a manual ap-
proach requiring human interaction.
Machine Learning Approach. In this approach, re-
searchers built their methods through employing three
levels of detection distributed between tweet level de-
tection, account level detection, and campaign level
detection.
Tweet Level. Martinez-Romo and Araujo (Martinez-
Romo and Araujo, 2013) identified spam tweet using
probabilistic language models to determine the topic
of the considered tweet. Using statistical features as a
representation for the tweet object, Benevenuto (Ben-
evenuto et al., 2010) identified spam tweet only by
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leveraging some features extracted from the tweet text
such as the number of words and the number of char-
acters. Then, the well-known SVM learning algo-
rithm has been applied on a manually created data-set
to learn a binary classifier. Indeed, the main strength
of tweet level is the fast detection from time compu-
tation point of view. However, adopting supervised
learning approach to have a fixed classification model
all the time is not an effective solution because of
the high evolving and changing in the spam content
overtime. In other words, hundred millions of ground
truth spam tweets are required to have robust model,
which is not possible to have such model.
Account Level. The works of (Wang, 2010; Ben-
evenuto et al., 2010; McCord and Chuah, 2011;
Stringhini et al., 2010) turned the attention toward ac-
count features, including the number of friends, num-
ber of followers, similarity between tweets, and ratio
of URLs in tweets. In more dedicated studies, the
work proposed in (Cao and Caverlee, 2015) identifies
the spam URLs through analyzing the shorten URLs
behavior like the number of clicks. However, the ease
of manipulation in the account features by spammers
gives a motivation to extract more complex features
using graph theory. For instance, the authors of (Yang
et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2012) examined the relation
between users using some graph metrics to measure
three features, including the node betweenness, local
clustering, and bi-directional relation ratio. Leverag-
ing such complex features gives high spam accounts
detection rate; however, they are not suitable for Twit-
ter based application because of the huge volume of
data that must be retrieved from Twitter’s servers.
Campaign Level. Chu et al. (Chu et al., 2012b)
treated the spam problem from collective perspective
point of view. They clustered the desired accounts ac-
cording to the URLs available in the posted tweets,
and then a defined set of features is extracted from
the clustered accounts to be incorporated in identi-
fying spam campaign using machine learning algo-
rithms. Chu, Gianvecchio, Wang, and Jajodia (Chu
et al., 2012a) proposed a classification model to cap-
ture the difference among bot, human, and cyborg
with considering the content of tweets, and tweeting
behavior. Indeed, the major drawback in the accom-
plished methods at campaign level is the relying in-
tensively on the features requiring too many API calls
on Twitter’s servers to obtain information like users’
tweets and followers. Indeed, this makes such solu-
tions not scalable for huge number of users (or ac-
counts).
Beyond the features design level, (Hu et al., 2014;
Hu et al., 2013) introduced an optimization frame-
work which uses the content of tweets and basic net-
work information to detect spammers using efficient
online learning approach. However, the main limita-
tions of such works are the need of information about
the network, raising the problem of scalability again.
Honeypot Approach. Social honeypot is viewed
as an information system resource that can monitor
spammers’ behavior through logging their informa-
tion such as the information of accounts and any avail-
able content (Lee et al., 2010). In fact, there is no ma-
jor difference between the Twitter’s anti-spam mech-
anism and social honeypot approach. Both of them
need administration control to produce final decision
about the accounts that fall in the honeypot trap. The
necessity of administration control is to reduce the
false positive rate, as an alternative solution for clas-
sifying blindly all users dropped in the trap as spam-
mers.
3 SPAMMY NAMING PATTERNS
PREDICTION
In this section, we introduce notations, definitions,
and the formalization of the problem that we address.
Then, we present the design of our method to predict
the spammy naming patterns.
3.1 Terminology Definition and
Problem Formalization
Twitter uses hashtags or keywords concept as a pos-
sible way for topic modeling to group similar tweets
together. Indeed, spammers leverage the hashtags, es-
pecially the trending ones, to publish spam content.
More particularly, spammers attack trending hashtags
through launching spam campaigns or bots to deliver
the spam content as fast as possible. Hence, intu-
itively, as extracting spammy naming patterns require
a collection of users having high probability for be-
ing operated as a spam bot, we exploit the concept
of hashtags as an entry point to predict the spammy
naming patterns. Thus, since each hashtag consists
of tweets posted by different users, we model the
hashtag as a finite set of distinct users, without go-
ing in the representation of tweet object, defined as
Hashtag(UH) = {u1,u2, ...}, where the user element
u• is further defined by 3-tuple u• =<UN,SN,UA >.
Each element inside the tuple is described as follows:
User Name (UN). Twitter, as other social networks,
allows users to name their accounts with maximum
length of 20 characters. Users can use whitespace,
symbols, special characters, and numeric numbers in
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Figure 2: An example describing the main stages adopted for predicting spammy naming patterns from the user name and
screen name attributes. The predicted patterns such as ”Mischief” might be leveraged for searching for spam accounts on
Twitter.
3.2 Model Design
In the literature, Freeeman (Freeman, 2013) designed
a probabilistic method to classify the profiles of
LinkedIn platform into binary classes (spam and non-
spam) using the account name only. The key idea of
the work is based on building a feature vector as a rep-
resentation for each account using N-gram method.
Then, for a given profile, a Bayes’ rule is applied to
decide whether the account is spam or not with es-
timating the prior probability component through an
annotated data-set. However, this approach is not
an adoptable solution for predicting the spammy pat-
terns due to the following reasons: (i) using N-gram
directly on large number of users to extract poten-
tial patterns increases the computational time, making
the direct use of N-gram not a practical solution; (ii)
Spammers’ behaviors in social networks are dynamic
either in the spam content or in using string patterns
to create spam bots, and thus adopting a fixed feature
vector (i.e. vector of bag of words) is not suitable for
modeling all spammy naming patterns.
Hence, we address the issue of predicting spammy
naming patterns in an unsupervised way through a 3-
step approach, described through an example shown
in Figure 2. First, for a given set of users, we de-
tect the communities that the users are belonging to
through leveraging the user name, screen name, and
user age meta-data. Detecting communities might be
viewed as a preprocessing step to cluster and group
the users that have common features (e.g. matched
names, similar accounts age), aiming to speed-up the
pattern extraction process. In the second step, for each
community being detected, we extract a set of poten-
tial patterns, as a representation for each community,
using N-gram method. At last, the probability dis-
tribution of each patterns set is compared with the
uniform probability distribution of the considered pat-
terns set, to make a decision about the type (spammy
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fillingtheusernamea ttribute.Twitterprovidesalso
a facility for theusers touseduplicatednames, and
thusthisfieldisnotnecessarytobeu nique.Thisat-
tributecanbemodeledasasetoforderedcharacters,
definedasU N={<1 ,a1>,...,<i ,ai>}wherei is
thepositionoftheai characterinthename.
ScreenName(SN).Thisattributeisamandatoryfield
and it must be filleda tt hec reationt imeo ft heac-
count. Usersmustchooseanuniquenamenotused
previouslybyotherusers,andwithmaximumlength
of16characters.Besides,Twitterconstrainsthespace
ofallowedcharacterstoalphabeticalletters,numbers,
and” ”character.Similarlytotheusernameattribute,
wemodelthisfieldasanorderedsetofcharacters,de-
finedasSN={<1 ,a1>,...,<i ,ai>}whereiisthe
positionofthecharacterai intheattribute.
UserAge (UA).Whenausercreatesanaccounton
Twitter, the creation date is registered on Twitter’s
serverswithoutprovidingpermissionstomodifyitin
the future. We exploit the creation date, as an ac-
cessibleandavailableproperty in theuserobject, to
computetheageoftheaccount. Formally,wecalcu-
latetheageindaystimeunitthroughsubtractingthe
current time(Timenow)from thecreationdateof the
account,defineasUA=Timenow−Timecreation.
Problem Formalization. Given a set of Tweets T
associatedwithaparticularhashtag, postedbyaset
of distinct usersUH such that |UH|≤|T|, our main
problem is to infer and discover a set of patterns P
usedinnamingspamaccountsasasearchableinfor-
mation,withoutrequiringanypriorknowledgeinad-
vance such as the relation between users (e.g. fol-
lowers and followees of users). More formally, we
aimatdesigningahypothesisfunctionysuch that it
processes and handles the given set of usersUH to
predictspammynamingpatterns,definedasy:U H→
{p1,p2, ...}wherep• isasetoforderedcharacters.
o non-spammy) of those patterns.
In the following, we introduce a mathematical
model adopted for community detection. Then, we
describe the proposed method in extracting string pat-
terns from user name and screen name attributes. At
last, we present our method by which the spammy
naming patterns are predicted.
3.2.1 Community Detection
As the topics or hashtags might be attacked by various
and different spam bots, more than one spammy nam-
ing pattern might be leveraged in creating spam bots.
Also, the probability of using same patterns in many
spam bots is quite low since no relation exists among
spammers. Therefore, performing community detec-
tion can contribute in distinguishing between different
spam bots where each bot can be viewed as a commu-
nity.
In this paper, we exploit the use of non-negative
matrix factorization (NMF) method to infer the com-
munities structure because of its outstanding per-
formance in clustering (Yang and Leskovec, 2013).
NMF works through partitioning an information ma-
trix into hidden factor matrices, defined mathemati-
cally as an optimization minimization problem:
min
H≥0
||X−HHT ||2F (1)
where || • ||F is the Frobenius norm of the considered
matrix, X ∈ R|UH |×|UH | is an information matrix rep-
resenting the strength of social connections between
users, H∈ R|UH |×K is the community structure hidden
factor matrix of K communities. More precisely, the
entry X(i, j) reflects the strength of the social connec-
tion between the ui ∈UH user and u j ∈UH user. The
entry H(i, j) in the hidden factor matrix can be inter-
preted as the confidence degree of user ui ∈U belong-
ing to the jth community. It is important to mention
that each user belongs to one community only, not
more than one.
Obviously, inferring the hidden matrix H requires
a formal definition of the information matrix X. For
example, X might be an adjacency matrix represent-
ing the social connections or links between the users
of the given set UH . However, obtaining the adjacency
matrix in our case is not possible because the available
information about users are limited to simple meta-
data describing the account of each user without pro-
viding information about the followers and followees.
Hence, in this paper, we leverage the available and
accessible information to estimate social connections
among users through proposing three definitions of
the information matrix X denoted as XSN , XUN , and
XUA, where each of which is formally defined as fol-
lows:
Screen Name Similarity (XSN). As the screen name
field must be unique, spammers tend to adopt a par-
ticular fixed pattern when creating multiple accounts
to act as a spam bot. For instance, in Figure 1, the
spammer has adopted the name ”voteddlovatu” as a
fixed pattern for the screen name field. Intuitively,
the high overlapping or matching in the screen name
among users increases the probability of the users to
belong to the same community. Therefore, we de-
fine the information matrix XSN to measure the de-
gree of matching in the screen name attribute. More
precisely, given two users ui,u j ∈ U , the degree of
matching for a particular entry in the matrix XSN is
defined as:
XSN(i, j) =
max{|m| : m ∈ Patterns)}
min(|ui.SN|, |u j.SN|)
Patterns =
⋃
N∈Max
N−gram(ui.SN)∩N−gram(u j.SN)
(2)
where | • | is the cardinality of the considered set,
Max = {1, ...,min(|ui.SN|, |u j.SN|)} is a set consist-
ing of positive integers representing the potential
number of characters that have overlapping between
the names, N− gram(•) is a function returning a set
of contiguous sequence of characters for the given
name (set of ordered characters) based on the value of
N. For better understanding, the 3-gram (or tri-gram)
of this screen name ”vote” is {{< 1,v >,< 2,o >,<
3, t >},{< 1,o >,< 2, t >,< 3,e >}}. The above
definition is able to detect the matched pattern wher-
ever it appears in the screen name attribute. For in-
stance, let ”vote12” and ”tovote” be screen names for
two different users, the degree of matching according
to equation 2 is around ( 4
6
)66.6% resulting from the
use of pattern ”vote”, regardless the position of the
pattern.
User Name Similarity (XUN). Differently from the
screen name attribute, spammers can duplicate the en-
try of user name attribute as many they desire. They
exploit representative (not random) names to attract
the normal users. Therefore, the full or partial match-
ing among users in such attribute increases the per-
formance of community detection. We define the in-
formation matrix XUN to catch the degree of similar-
ity among users in the user name attribute. Formally,
given two users ui,u j ∈U , the degree of similarity is
defined as:
XUN(i, j) =
max{|m| : m ∈ Patterns)}
min(|ui.UN|, |u j.UN|)
Patterns =
⋃
N∈Max
N−gram(ui.UN)∩N−gram(u j.UN)
(3)
where here Max = {1, ...,min(|ui.UN|, |u j.UN|)}.
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Age Closeness (XUA). As the spammers automate
the process of creating Twitter accounts to act as a
spam bot, few hours are enough to create hundreds
of accounts. Obviously, the common property among
these accounts is the age (creation time) of accounts
as one possible way to distinguish between different
spam bots. We leverage the closeness in the age of ac-
counts as an additional factor to detect communities.
More formally, for a given two users ui,u j ∈ U , we
compute the difference in the age between each pair
of users where the corresponding entry in the infor-
mation matrix XA is defined as
XUA(i, j) =
|ui.age−u j.age|
max{u1.age−u2.age|u1,u2 ∈UH}
(4)
The key point of performing normalization is to
range the entire values between 0 and 1 where the in-
creasing in the value means that the pair of accounts
was not created in the same time.
Combining Information Matrices. With these three
information matrices, NMF method allows to inte-
grate them together in the same objective function.
Thus, the new version of the objective function is de-
fined as:
min
H≥0
||XSN−HHT ||2F + ||X
UN−HHT ||2F + ||X
UA−HHT ||2F
(5)
Obviously, equation 5 infers the hidden factor ma-
trix H to represent the consistent community structure
of the users.
Optimization Method. The objective function is not
jointly convex and no closed form solution exists.
Hence, we propose the use of gradient descent as an
alternative optimization approach. As we have one
free variable (H), the gradient descent method updates
it iteratively until the variable converge.
Formally, let L(H) denotes to the objective func-
tion given in equation 5 . At the iteration τ, the updat-
ing equation is given as:
Hτ = Hτ−1−η.
∂L(Hτ−1)
∂(H)
= Hτ−1−2η
(
6Hτ−1(Hτ−1)T Hτ−1
− (XSN +XUN +XUA)Hτ−1
− ((XSN)T +(XUN)T +(XUA)T )Hτ−1
)
(6)
3.2.2 String Patterns Extraction
Once the K defined communities are inferred
through finding the hidden factor matrix H, the
next stage is to extract naming patterns cor-
responding to each inferred community. Be-
fore going on, we introduce a definition for
the ith community, defined by 6-tuple Ci =<
U,PT SN ,PTUN ,PSND ,P
UN
D ,SNSpam,UNSpam,L >,
where
• U is a set of users belonging to the ith such that
Ci.U ∩C j.U = /0, ∀i, j ∈ {1,2, ...,K}, i 6= j, and⋃
i Ci.U =UH .
• PT SN and PTUN are two finite sets of string pat-
terns extracted from the screen name and user
name attributes, respectively, of the users of ith
community.
• PSND and P
UN
D represent the probability distribu-
tions of screen name and user name string pat-
terns, respectively. We model each probability
distribution as a finite set of 2-tuple object, de-
fined as P•D = {< p1,v1 >,< p2,v2 >,....}, where
p• is a string pattern and v• ∈ [0,1] represents the
occurrence probability of the string pattern p•.
• SNSpam and UNSpam are two string patterns where
each represents the spammy pattern of screen
name and user name attributes, respectively. The
value of these two strings are set at the spammy
patterns identification step (next sub-section).
Also, these two strings are set to empty in case
the ith community is labeled as non-spam.
• L is the class label of the ith community, L ∈
{Spam,non−Spam}
For string patterns extraction step, we apply the
N − gram character method on each name (screen
name or user name) in the inferred community. As
spammers may define patterns varying in both length
and position, to catch all or most potential patterns,
we use different values of N ranging from three to
the length of the name. We avoid the values one and
two since it is meaningless to have one or two char-
acters pattern. Formally, for a given name in form of
Name = {< 1,a1 >,< 2,a2 >,...}, the potential pat-
terns of which are extracted by
Patterns(Name) =
⋃
N∈Max
N−gram(Name) (7)
where Max = {3, ..., |Name|} is a finite set of possible
values of N.
With the introduced definition, the string patterns
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wheretheparameterηdenotestothegradientde-
scent step in updating the matrix H. We assign the
valueofη toasmallconstantvalue (i.e. 0.05). As
thegradientdescentmethodisaniterativeprocess,a
stopconditionisrequiredinsuchacase.Thus,weex-
ploittwostopconditions:(i)thenumberofiterations,
denotedasM; (ii)and theabsolutechange in theH
matrixintwoconsecutiveiterationstobelessthana
threshold,i.e.|(||Hτ||F−||Hτ−1||F)|≤ε.
sets of ith community are given as:
Ci.PT
SN =
⋃
u∈Ci.U
Patterns(u.SN)
Ci.PT
UN =
⋃
u∈Ci.U
Patterns(u.UN)
(8)
3.2.3 Spammy Pattern Identification
After extracting the corresponding patterns for each
community, we have to identify the spammy naming
patterns either in screen name or user name attributes.
Thus, we have to define a classification function pre-
dicting the spammy pattern strings. To do so, we
examine first each community through leveraging its
patterns to decide whether the community is a spam
or not. However, as no alternative way to identify
spammy patterns, it is not necessary that all users in
the spam community are spammers. We justify this
issue because of the lack information (e.g. followers)
about users to make accurate community detection.
Moreover, since no exact solution exists to find the
optimal hidden matrix H, the iterative method used
may not find the global minimal hidden matrix H.
Hence, to make such a decision about each
community detected, we propose to compare
the probability distribution of patterns with
the uniform probability distribution of pat-
terns. For instance, for a particular community,
let PT SN = {”mischie f ”,”isch”,” 12”,” 14”},
PDSN = {< ”mischie f ”, 0.7 >,< ” 15”,0.1 >,<
” 14”,0.1 >,< ” 12”,0.1 >} be a set of screen
name patterns with its probability distribution, the
uniform probability distribution of these patterns
will be {< ”mischie f ”, 0.25 >,< ” 15”,0.25 >,<
” 14”,0.25 >,< ” 12”,0.25 >}. The intuition be-
hind this proposition is that each spam community is
biased toward a particular pattern in naming accounts
and thus its probability is high compared to the
other few patterns belonging to the same set. More
precisely, the probability distribution of patterns in
spam communities is far from being uniform. On the
other side, the distribution of patterns in non-spam
ones is close for being uniform. We quantify the
similarity between distributions through performing
cross-correlation between the probability distribution
of patterns set associated with a community and the
corresponding uniform distribution of the considered
patterns set. Formally, we compute the probability
distribution similarity (PDS) through the following
generic formula:
PDS(PD) =
Area(PD ⋆P
uni f orm
D )
Area(P
uni f orm
D ⋆P
uni f orm
D )
(9)
where PD ∈ {Ci.P
SN
D ,Ci.P
UN
D } is the probability dis-
tribution of user name or screen name patterns of ith
community, P
uni f orm
D is the uniform probability dis-
tribution of the considered patterns set, and Area(•)
is a function computing the area under the new re-
sulting distribution by the correlation operation. The
purpose of normalizing the area of cross-correlation
by the auto-correlation of uniform distribution is to
range the value between 0 and 1. The high value of
degree similarity means that the considered commu-
nity has high probability for being non-spam bot. One
worthy note is that the all users of the communities
that are classified as ”spam” might not be spammers
(spam accounts). This problem might occur because
of the difficulty of finding the optimal hidden matrix
H. Furthermore, predicting the true spam communi-
ties accurately is not possible since the available infor-
mation about each user (or account) is no more than
simple meta-data.
We exploit the degree of similarity as one possible
way to label each community as spam or non-spam.
However, intuitively, the degree of similarity given
here is not a crisp value and thus it is required to de-
fine a cut-off point to discriminate among the spam
and non-spam communities (bots). Thus, for a given
community Ci, we propose the following cut-off point
by which the considered community is classified into
spam and non-spam.
Ci.L=
{
spam min(PDS(Ci.P
UN
D ),PDS(Ci.P
SN
D ))≤ T h
non− spam otherwise
where T h is a global threshold value fixed (i.e. 0.1),
and determined experimentally for all communities.
The key idea of taking the minimum is that spammers
may use patterns in one of the considered attributes
(screen name or user name), not necessary in both of
them.
In the last step, for each community labeled as
spam, we choose one pattern from each string pat-
terns set (screen name and user name sets). We select
the string pattern that has highest probability value
among other patterns in the same set. The longest
pattern is chosen, in case of two or more patterns have
the same probability value.
4 DATA-SET DESCRIPTION AND
GROUND TRUTH
The data-sets used at tweet level detection (Ben-
evenuto et al., 2010; Martinez-Romo and Araujo,
2013) are not publicly available for research use.
Also, for privacy reasons, the researchers of social
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Table 1: Statistics of the data-set.
Number of Trending Topics 50
Number of Users 210,315
Number of Tweets 567,675
Table 2: Statistics of the annotated users (accounts) and
tweets.
Spam non-Spam
Number of Tweets 172,191 (30.3%) 395,484 (69.7%)
Number of Users 37,126(17.7%) 173,189(82.3%)
5 RESULTS AND EVALUATIONS
5.1 Experimental Setup
Metrics. Various metrics are used in information re-
trieval area to evaluate the degree of relevance be-
tween documents and an input search query. In our
work, we adopt three widely used metrics (Manning
et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2013): (i) Precision at
L (P@L); (ii) Recall at L (R@L); (iii) and Normalized
Discounted Cumulative Gain at L (NDCG@L). In
our context, P@L corresponds to the ratio of spam ac-
counts retrieved in the top L retrieved accounts. R@L
represents the ratio of spam accounts retrieved in the
top L with respect to the total number of spam ac-
counts in the collection. As precision metric fails to
take into account the positions of the relevant spam
accounts among the top L, NDCG@L metric pe-
nalizes the late appearance of spam accounts in the
search list logarithmically proportional to the posi-
tion in the list retrieved. For the values, we mea-
sure the three performance metrics at two ranks L ∈
{100,500}.
Baselines. To assess the performance of our method
in retrieving spam accounts, we propose five simple
retrieval baseline methods, which rank accounts of a
hashtag according to a particular criteria, summarized
in:
• Random (RN). This method ranks accounts in a
random way without biasing toward any account
in the set.
• Recent Age Account (RAA). This method sorts
accounts in an ascending order according to the
accounts’ creation date (age).
• Old Age Account (OAA). Conversely to RAA
method, OAA sorts accounts in a descending or-
der according to the accounts’ creation date (age).
• Recent Posted Tweet (RPT). This method ranks
accounts according to the publication date of the
considered hashtag tweets. Thus, it sorts first
the tweets in an ascending order according to the
tweets’ date and then selects the corresponding
accounts in the same order.
• Old Posted Tweet (OPT). This method is sim-
ilar in concept to the RPT method; however, it
sorts the tweets first in a descending order and
then picks the corresponding accounts in the same
order.
Parameter Setting. For community detection stage,
we set η = 0.001, M = 10,000, and ε = 0.0001 as
values for the learning rate, number of iterations, and
the threshold of absolute change in the hidden matrix
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networks provide the IDs of the interested in object
(e.g. tweets, accounts) to retrieve them from the
servers of the target social network. However, in-
spiredby thenatureofspamproblem,providing the
IDsofspamtweetsoraccountsisnotenoughbecause
Twittermightalreadyhavesuspendedtheiraccounts.
Crawling Method. Hence, we exploit our research
teamcrawlertocollectaccountsandtweets,launched
since 1/Jan/2015. The streaming method is used to
getanaccessfor1%ofglobaltweets,asanunbiased
crawlingway. Suchamethodiscommonlyexploited
intheliteraturetocollectandcreatedata-setinsocial
networksresearches.
Data-setDescription. Usingour teamTwitterdata-
set, we clustered the collected tweets based on the
hashtagavailableinthetweetwithignoringthetweets
that do not contain hashtag. Then, we selected the
tweetsof50trendinghashtags(e.g.Trump)randomly
sampled toconductourexperiments. Table1shows
themainstatisticsoftheselectedhashtagstweets.We
exploited this way in crawling and sampling to re-
move any possible biasing in the data, and to draw
unbiasedconclusions.
Ground Truth Data-set. To evaluate the effective-
nessofthespammystringpatternsinretrievingspam
accounts,wecreatedanannotateddata-setthroughla-
beling each tweet as spam or non-spam. However,
withthehugeamountoftweets,usingmanualanno-
tation approach to have labeled data is an impracti-
calsolution. Hence,weleveragedawidelyfollowed
annotation process in the social spam detection re-
searches.Theprocesscheckswhethertheuserofeach
tweetwassuspendedbyTwitter. Incaseofsuspen-
sion, theuser isconsideredasaspammeraswellas
the corresponding tweet is labeled as a spam; oth-
erwise we assign non-spam and legitimate user for
tweet anduser, respectively. In total, as reported in
Table2,wefoundthatmorethan172,000tweetswere
classifiedasspam,postedbyalmost37,000spammers
(spamaccounts).
Table 3: Performance results of five baseline methods evaluated using Precision@L, Recall@L, and NDCG@L at L ∈
{100,500}.
Baseline Retrieval Method P@100 P@500 R@100 R@500 NDCG@100 NDCG@500
Random (RN) 7.9% 7.7% 0.5% 1.9% 7.7% 7.7%
Recent Age Account (RAA) 19.9% 20.9% 1.3% 5.8% 19.5% 20.7%
Old Age Account (OAA) 0.6% 1.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.6% 1.0%
Recent Posted Tweet (RPT) 6.6% 6.9% 0.4% 1.7% 6.3% 6.8%
Old Posted Tweet (OPT) 7.8% 7.0% 0.5% 1.9% 8.0% 7.1%
Table 4: Performance results of the screen name and user name spammy patterns in retrieving spam accounts, experimented
at various classification threshold (Th) and at different values of K ∈ {2,5,10} as a number of communities, in terms of
Precision@L, Recall@L, and NDCG@L at L ∈ {100,500}.
Screen-name pattern User-name pattern
K Th P@100 P@500 R@100 R@500 NDCG@100 NDCG@500 P@100 P@500 R@100 R@500 NDCG@100 NDCG@500
0.1 55.4% 33.4% 7.8% 19.8% 58.9% 46.4% 48.9% 43.1% 7.1% 23.8% 47.1% 43.8%
0.2 54.2% 26.3% 7.7% 15.0% 55.9% 37.0% 49.4% 35.3% 7.2% 18.7% 48.4% 37.3%
0.3 48.7% 19.2% 6.7% 10.9% 55.1% 30.6% 49.4% 33.1% 7.4% 17.5% 48.6% 35.4%
0.4 45.1% 18.3% 6.0% 9.8% 49.8% 23.5% 46.1% 31.6% 6.9% 16.4% 46.2% 33.9%
0.5 44.8% 17.2% 5.9% 9.0% 46.9% 22.5% 44.9% 30.1% 6.8% 15.3% 45.0% 32.4%
0.6 44.4% 15.4% 5.9% 8.9% 46.4% 21.5% 46.7% 29.5% 7.0% 15.1% 46.6% 31.9%
0.7 42.0% 13.7% 5.5% 8.0% 46.5% 20.0% 43.0% 28.4% 6.5% 14.3% 43.3% 30.6%
0.8 38.8% 12.5% 5.3% 7.5% 44.6% 18.3% 41.6% 27.5% 6.3% 13.7% 42.1% 29.6%
0.9 36.0% 10.3% 5.3% 7.0% 41.6% 16.9% 36.9% 25.9% 5.1% 11.8% 37.7% 27.7%
2
1.0 36.5% 9.8% 5.4% 6.7% 39.3% 14.6% 37.8% 25.9% 5.2% 11.8% 38.6% 27.9%
0.1 59.4% 32.9% 8.2% 18.1% 59.8% 36.9% 48.8% 41.6% 7.1% 22.3% 47.4% 42.6%
0.2 55.9% 26.1% 7.6% 14.9% 56.9% 30.7% 50.7% 36.9% 7.5% 19.8% 49.5% 38.9%
0.3 50.9% 19.7% 7.2% 11.6% 52.1% 24.3% 49.8% 34.0% 7.3% 17.8% 48.6% 36.1%
0.4 39.2% 14.9% 5.3% 8.1% 41.9% 19.0% 44.2% 29.4% 6.3% 14.4% 44.6% 31.7%
0.5 39.1% 13.6% 5.2% 7.1% 42.2% 18.0% 41.7% 28.1% 5.9% 13.4% 41.8% 30.1%
0.6 40.4% 12.3% 5.4% 6.9% 44.0% 17.1% 41.2% 26.7% 6.2% 13.0% 42.5% 29.2%
0.7 42.6% 13.2% 5.4% 7.0% 45.8% 18.1% 42.3% 28.5% 6.2% 14.1% 42.3% 30.5%
0.8 41.2% 12.2% 5.4% 7.5% 44.1% 16.9% 38.4% 26.6% 5.6% 12.6% 38.8% 28.5%
0.9 37.9% 10.8% 5.2% 7.0% 40.7% 15.2% 37.7% 26.2% 5.1% 11.8% 38.5% 28.1%
5
1.0 37.0% 10.5% 5.0% 7.2% 40.4% 15.0% 38.9% 25.6% 5.5% 11.6% 39.7% 27.7%
0.1 60.2% 30.7% 8.3% 15.7% 60.8% 35.0% 50.8% 43.3% 7.5% 23.0% 44.3% 28.9%
0.2 54.0% 23.3% 7.5% 12.3% 56.0% 28.1% 49.3% 35.5% 7.3% 18.6% 37.7% 24.5%
0.3 47.0% 18.5% 6.3% 9.5% 48.9% 22.9% 48.4% 32.7% 7.1% 16.8% 35.0% 22.9%
0.4 43.4% 16.4% 5.7% 7.5% 45.7% 20.7% 44.1% 28.9% 6.3% 13.7% 31.1% 20.5%
0.5 38.9% 13.6% 5.0% 6.7% 41.9% 17.9% 39.4% 27.3% 5.7% 12.1% 29.4% 19.7%
0.6 34.5% 11.8% 4.4% 5.5% 37.9% 15.9% 38.0% 25.3% 5.7% 11.6% 27.5% 18.7%
0.7 35.4% 10.0% 4.8% 5.6% 39.5% 14.6% 38.3% 24.6% 5.6% 11.2% 26.7% 18.3%
0.8 37.2% 10.8% 5.0% 6.1% 41.3% 15.5% 37.4% 24.8% 5.4% 11.4% 27.1% 18.4%
0.9 35.9% 10.7% 4.4% 6.9% 40.1% 15.2% 36.9% 25.7% 4.9% 11.5% 27.9% 18.8%
10
1.0 35.6% 10.0% 4.5% 7.1% 40.0% 14.6% 38.1% 26.1% 5.1% 11.9% 28.4% 19.0%
H, respectively. For the number of communities K,
we experiment our method at three different values,
K ∈ {2,5,10}, to study its effect. For the size of in-
formation matrices X•, we consider all distinct users
(accounts) of each hashtag without excluding any user
available in the testing collection. As an iterative al-
gorithm is used for solving the optimization problem,
we initialize each entry of the hidden matrix H by a
small positive real value drawn from an uniform dis-
tribution on the interval [0,1]. For the threshold (T h),
we study the effect of this threshold in predicting ef-
fective spammy string patterns using different values,
T h ∈ [0.1,1].
Experiment Procedure. For each hashtag, we per-
form the following steps: (i) we extract the users who
posted the tweets related to the considered hashtag;
(ii) we apply then the community detection method on
the extracted users set; (iii) afterward, each commu-
nity is labeled as spam and non-spam based on the de-
signed objective function for a certain threshold (T h);
(iv) for each community labeled as spam, the highest
likelihood string pattern is extracted from both screen
name and user name potential sets, respectively; (v)
for each spammy string pattern chosen in the previ-
ous step, we retrieve the accounts that contain the se-
lected pattern based on the considered attribute (user
name or screen name), using all accounts in the data
collection; (vi) the accounts retrieved are ranked ac-
cording to the degree of matching or overlapping be-
tween the exploited pattern and the string of the con-
sidered attribute, using the definition of equation 2;
(vii) the performance of the spammy string pattern in
retrieving spam accounts is evaluated using the three
described metrics; (viii) the previous step is repeated
for the pattern chosen from a spam community; (ix)
in last step, the performance of all spammy string pat-
terns of the selected attribute (screen name or user
name) is averaged for the final computation.
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report the evaluation results of both attributes, experi-
mented at different classification thresholds T h and at
finite set of number of communities K. As an external
comparison with the baseline methods, our approach
has superior performance in retrieving spam accounts
either when considering screen name or user name at-
tributes. As an internal comparison, we find that 0.1 is
almost the optimal classification threshold in terms of
the performance metrics. We don’t report the results
of the threshold when be less than 0.1 since no spam
community have been identified. The optimal thresh-
old value, 0.1, ensures our hypothesis that the distri-
bution of patterns in a spam community follows non-
uniform distribution. Also, we find that increasing the
classification threshold implies to classify communi-
ties as spam where they are truly not spam ones. Con-
sequently, this misclassification at community level
produces spammy patterns which are not spammy at
all. Indeed, this explains the degradation in the per-
formance results when increasing the classification
threshold. The effect of number of communities K
is obvious in improving precision@100, recall@100,
and NDCG@100 metrics. We associate this increas-
ing with the number of spam bots that had attacked the
considered 50 hashtags. More precisely, when a hash-
tag is attacked by 10 different spam bots, the low val-
ues of K cannot provide all possible spammy patterns,
and thus not all spam accounts might be retrieved. On
contrary, we observe that the increasing in the num-
ber of communities decreases the precision@500, re-
call@500, and NDCG@500 metrics. We explain this
behavior because of the existence non-spam accounts
having partial matching with the spammy patterns of
either screen name or user name attributes.
Obviously, according to the results, none of the
both attributes has superior performance compared
to each other. For instance, the spammy patterns of
screen name attribute perform better than the spammy
patterns of user name attribute in terms of preci-
sion@100, recall@100, and NDCG@100. The selec-
tion among screen name and user name attributes in
performing the retrieval process is completely depen-
dent on the size of the list that contains the poten-
tial spam accounts (e.g 100, 500). For instance, user
name attribute is preferred when performing the re-
trieval task to return 500 potential spam accounts.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
Conventional spam detection methods check individ-
ual tweets or accounts for the existence of spam. In
this paper, we study the spam problem from informa-
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5.2 ExperimentalResults
Tothebestofourknowledge,theworkintroducedin
thispaper is thefirstoneinspamretrievaldirection,
where all prior works in the literature have focused
onspamdetectiononly. Hence,wecompareourap-
proachwiththefivebaselinesproposedasareference
pointforthecomparisonstep.
In the firste xperiment,w ee valuatet heperfor-
mance of the fiveb aseliner etrievalm ethods(RN,
RAA, OAA, RPT, and OPT) by applying each
method on each hashtag in our data-set. Averaged
on all hashtags, we observe in Table 3 that the re-
cent age account retrieval (RAA) method has supe-
rior performance in terms of precision, recall, and
NDCG,compared to the rest fourbaselinemethods.
ForRAAmethod,the19.9%valueofP@100canbe
interpreted in twoways: (i) thenumberofspamac-
counts retrieved (ranked based on accounts’ age) in
the top100accounts is20; (ii)or theprobability to
retrieveaspamaccountinthetop100isabout19.9%.
The recall@100 values of all baseline methods are
not at the same level as precision@100 values. In-
deed,thelowvaluesofrecallarebecauseofthehuge
numberofspamaccountsexisting inourcollection.
This interpretationcanbeensuredby thesignificant
increasing in the recall@500 values of all baselines
wheremorespamaccountscanbefoundatrank500.
However,therecallvaluesofallbaselinemethodsare
notsatisfactoryandadoptableforretrievingallspam
accounts in the collection. More precisely, the best
recall@500 is obtained by RAA method which has
retrievednomorethan2,200spamaccountsavailable
inourdata-set. Thebehaviorofbaselinemethodsin
regardsofNDCGmetricisalmostsimilartothepre-
cision metric. The strength of the NDCG metric is
ingivingweightforeachaccountretrievedbasedon
its position in the list (i.e. top position = high-
est weight). The 19.5% of NDCG@100 of RAA
baselinemethodgivesanindicationthatthespamac-
countsretrievedarenotinthetop80accounts.Over-
all,theperformanceresultsobtainedbythefivebase-
linemethodsdrawthefollowingconclusions: (i)the
resultsofRAAmethodensurethevalidityofastrong
hypothesis thatspamaccountsarerecent inage; (ii)
therecallvaluesofthefivemethodsarenotsatisfac-
torytoadopttheminretrievingspamaccountsatall.
In producing the experimental results of our
method, theproceduredescribedin5.1subsectionis
performedoneachhashtaginthedata-setused,with
averagingtheresultsoverthenumberofhashtags.We
perform two main experiments to provide more in-
sightsintotheimpactofscreennameandusername
attributesinretrievingspamaccounts.InTable4,we
tion retrieval point of view to provide searchable in-
formation acting as a query to retrieve spam accounts.
Our work uses the simple meta-data of a particular set
of users posted tweets associated with a topic (hash-
tag) to predict spammy naming patterns as a search-
able information. Our work can be leveraged by Twit-
ter community to search for spam accounts and also
for Twitter based applications that work on large col-
lection of tweets. As our work is the first in this direc-
tion, we intend to extend the method to predict search-
able information also from tweets as well, with work-
ing on improving the retrieval metrics of the current
method.
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